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Introduction
The literature on contests is voluminous and still flourishing. The most studied contests are the all-pay auction and the Tullock (lottery) contest (see, for example, Konrad, 2008a, 2008b; Konrad, 2009; Nitzan, 1994) . The equilibrium properties of these separate contests, including the aggregate and individual efforts, have been compared in Fang (2002) , Epstein, Mealem, and Nitzan (2011) , and Franke et al (2012) . 1 In this paper, I present a contest which is a combination of these two widely popular contests. Such a nested contest may arise in the situations described below.
In the wake of a judging controversy at the Winter 2002 Olympic games, the governing council of the International Skating Union (ISU) scrapped its judging system. The ISU adopted a new judging system called the Code of Points (COP). In 2006, the COP took effect and became mandatory at all international competitions including the Winter Olympics.
The ISU's "Code of points" is a two-stage process. But for my purposes, it suffices to note that a panel of twelve judges award a mark for each skater's grade of execution (GOE) . The GOE value from the twelve judges is then averaged by randomly selecting nine judges, discarding the highest and lowest values, and averaging the remaining seven. Therefore, this is a contest in which the players (i.e., the skaters) do not know which members of the awarding committee have the power to make the final decision. In a related context, Epstein et al. (2007, p. 114) observed that "... in some bureaucratic organizations, not only is the distribution of power among the acting figures within the system unknown, but even the set of potential decision makers may only be partially known. In particular, the contestants may not know the identity of the "wire-puller" who controls the decision-making system, possibly from behind the scenes."
This type of contest is examined in Amegashie (2006) and Epstein et al. (2007) .
However, in these papers the players can direct their lobbying effort to specifically target potential judges and each potential judge or rent-giver awards the prize based on an imperfectlydiscriminating contest success function (e.g., the Tullock function).
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In this paper, a potential judge may base his decision on a perfectly-discriminating contest success function (i.e., he awards the prize to the player with the highest effort) or on an imperfectly-discriminating success function. In this sense, the contest is a combination of the all-pay auction and the Tullock contest. Also, each player's effort is simultaneously observed by all potential judges.
As another example, consider a committee with N ≥ 3 members who must award a single prize in a contest. Suppose that two members of the committee have very strong personalities and different views of the world. Call them H and L. These members could also be the two most senior members of the committee. Suppose the other members of the committee are followers, so H and L compete with each other to get as many members as possible to their different points of view. With probability, λ, H can sway a majority of the committee members to his point of view while L can do so with probability 1 − λ, where 0 < λ < 1. Then we have a contest in which the contest success function can be modeled as a convex combination of two different success functions. 3 Furthermore, committees may be prone to groupthink. In his influential book, Irving Janis (1972) defined groupthink as a "... mode of thinking that people engage in when they are 2 See also Alcade and Dahm (2008) who briefly examine a contest which is a combination of the Tullock contest success function and another imperfectly-discriminating success function (i.e., the serial contest function; see also Alcalde and Dahm, 2007) . 3 Amegashie (2002 Amegashie ( , 2006 and Congleton (1984) consider contests with an N-member rent-giving committee, where N ≥ 3. These models are related to but different from the model in this paper because unlike the present model, the votes of more than one member of the committee counts and all the members act independently or are not influenced by other committee members. In Congleton (1984) , the rent is awarded by a three-member committee where each committee member votes for the players who lobbies him the most. He showed that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. Whether there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium in that game has not, to the best of my knowledge, been investigated. deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action." Such a committee may be interested in reaching unanimous decisions because a divided decision makes them (i.e., the committee members) look bad. Therefore, members of the committee may try to minimize conflict and reach a consensus decision without critical evaluation of alternative viewpoints. In such situations, only a few alternatives (e.g., only two), for evaluating performance may be considered in any decision-making. These two alternatives may correspond to the views of only two committee members and, with some known probability, one of these two people will be successful in convincing the entire group.
In this paper, I use the Tullock success function with returns parameter, R = 1. This is the most popular version of the Tullock success function in the literature. As mentioned above, I
combine it with the auction success function. In the next section, I investigate the equilibria of this nested contest and compare it to the Tullock contest and the all-pay auction. Section 3 discusses the results.
A nested contest
Consider a complete-information contest in which the prize will be awarded by one of two people (i.e., judges, bureaucrats, decision-makers, etc): call them H and L. There are two risk-neutral players, 1 and 2, who compete for the prize. Player j values the prize at V j > 0, j = 1, 2. Suppose that V 1 ≥ V 2 > 0. Player j's effort is e j ≥ 0, j = 1,2. Each judge, if he is chosen as the decision-maker, votes for the contestant with the higher output (or performance). Judge H is chosen with probability λ while L is chosen with probability 1 − λ, where
. The players must choose their efforts before knowing which judge will be chosen as the decision-maker and they cannot separately target judges. This is, for example, the case when the judges simultaneously observe the efforts of the players and no additional interaction with any judge is allowed. Of course, one does need two different (potential) judges. It suffices to have a single judge whose type, H or L, is drawn from a binary distribution where pr(H) = λ, pr(L) = 1 − λ, and λ (0,1).
Suppose that judge H observes effort without noise such that he sees player j's output as H j y = e j , j = 1, 2. Judge L observes effort with noise such that he sees player j's output as L j y = g(e j , ε), where ε is a random variable with a continuous distribution, j = 1,2. These may reflect differences in ability in evaluating performance.
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Alternatively, we could assume that either judge observes effort without noise but judge L, in addition to the players' efforts, takes other factors into account in his decision-making but these factors are not known to the players (Clark and Riis, 1996; Corchon and Dahm, 2010) .
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This interpretation is consistent with Corchon and Dahm (2010, p. 85 ) who assume that "...
contestants are uncertain about a characteristic of the decider that is relevant for his decision. So contestants exert effort without knowing the realization of the characteristic." For two players 4 Such differences in evaluation may be seen in contests such as reality TV shows like American Idol and "Dancing with the Stars" where the votes of expert judges and viewers count (e.g., see Amegashie, 2009) or elections in which some voters are more informed than others. Expert judges are likely to view effort with little or no noise while the viewers are likely to do so with noise. In Amegashie (2009) and all the papers cited here, it is assumed that both groups observe effort with noise, although the noise of one group (e.g., the experts) has a smaller (positive) variance. 5 For example, the members of a recruitment committee may all care about a candidate's technical ability (e.g., in academia, this may be whether he can publish in good journals). All members of the committee can evaluate technical ability perfectly but while some people care about only technical ability, others may also care the social skills of a candidate (e.g., is he a team player? will he be a good citizen of the department?).
and a uniform distribution of the judge's characteristic, they show that one can obtain the Tullock CSF.
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Based on previous works, we may assume that the functional form g(.) and the distribution of ε are such that prob( Or, as mentioned above, one could follow the interpretation in, for example, Corchon and Dahm (2010) where the judge observes effort without noise but has a characteristic that is not known by the contestants. Accordingly, it follows that if judge L is the decisionmaker, he will choose player j as the winner with probability.
where j ≠ k, j = 1,2; k = 1, 2. The Tullock CSF with the returns parameter, R = 1 (i.e., the CSF in (1)), is the most popular version of the Tullock function that is used in the literature.
Since judge H observes effort with no noise, the probability that he will vote for player j is given by 
6 Demonstrating this result is straightforward. Suppose that the rent-giver's payoff is U 1 (θ,e 1 ) = (1 − θ)f(e 1 ) if he awards the prize to player 1 and his payoff is U 2 (θ, e 2 ) = θf(e 2 ) if he awards the prize to player 2, where f(e j ) is a strictly increasing function and θ is a random characteristic of the rent-giver that is uniformly distributed on [0,1], j = 1, 2. Then the probability that he will award the prize to player 1 is prob(U 1 (θ,e 1 ) > U 2 (θ, e 2 )) and is equal to prob(θ <  ) = f(e 1 )/[f(e 1 ) + f(e 2 )], where  ≡ f(e 1 )/[f(e 1 ) + f(e 2 )]. Then the Tullock CSF with returns parameter equal to 1 is obtained if f(e j ) = e j , j = 1, 2. 7 See, for example, Hillman and Riley (1989) , Jia (2008) , Fu and Lu (2012) and the surveys on the stochastic derivation of contest success functions in Konrad (2009 ), and Jia, Skaperdas, and Vaidya (2011 where j ≠ k, j = 1,2; k = 1, 2.
Then when player j chooses his effort (bid), he believes that he will win the contest with But in contests as in Amegashie (2006) and Epstein et al. (2007) where the identity of the ultimate decision-maker is not known and where the potential decision-makers have different abilities in or different approaches to evaluating performance, it is reasonable to nest these two CSFs. Furthermore, given that these are the two predominant CSFs in the literature,
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it is interesting to examine a nested CSF which is a convex combination of these two CSFs.
Player j chooses e j to maximize
where j ≠ k; j = 1,2; k = 1,2. In the present model with two players, the solution of this contest when λ = 0 (Tullock contest) or λ = 1 (all-pay auction) is well known. The Tullock contest has a unique equilibrium in pure strategies 11 while the all-pay auction has a unique equilibrium in 9 The Tullock contest is sometimes referred to as a lottery or an imperfectly discriminating contest while the all-pay auction is referred to as the perfectly discriminating contest. As noted earlier, the aggregate and individual efforts in these separate contests have been compared in Fang (2002) , Epstein, Mealem, and Nitzan (2011), and Franke et al (2012) . 10 For example, Alcade and Dahm (2010, p. 5) observe that "[A] common modelling approach is to consider the two polar cases of Tullock's rent seeking game with exponent equal to one and the limiting case of the all-pay auction in which the exponent goes to infinity." 11 For a discussion of general problems of existence in the Tullock contest, see, for example, Baye et al. (1994) and Konrad (2009). mixed strategies.
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My goal is to characterize the equilibria in the intermediate case of
and compare it to the cases of λ = 0 and λ = 1.
Equilibrium analysis

Pure-strategy equilibria
Note that Δ j is the expected payoff of player j in a Tullock contest in which his valuation is j V , j = 1,2. We can rewrite (4) as
j ≠ k; j = 1,2; k = 1,2.
I state the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Suppose that V 1 > V 2 and
exists an equilibrium in pure strategies in which player 1 bids
; the expected payoffs are
, and (ii) this equilibrium is the only pure-strategy equilibrium.
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12 See Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye et al. (1996) . When there are more than two players, the all-pay auction may not have a unique mixed strategy equilibrium (Baye et al., 1996) . Siegel (2009) presents a general analysis of a class of contests of which the complete-information all-pay auction is a special case. The contest in this paper does not belong to the class of contests studied in Siegel (2009) . 13 Of course, this proposition also holds in the well-known case of λ = 0.
Proof: Given previous results on the equilibrium of the Tullock game when R = 1 (e.g., Nti, 1999) , we know that 0 e e 
. Since V 1 > V 2 , it follows that * 2 * 1 e e  > 0. So in equilibrium, player 1's payoff
and player 2's equilibrium payoff is
We can rewrite the players' equilibrium payoffs as:
and
Since ∂Δ 1 /∂e 1 = 0 and * 2 * 1 e e  in equilibrium, player 1 has no incentive to bid more than his equilibrium bid because this reduces Δ 1 without increasing λV 1 . If he deviates to a lower bid he again reduces Δ 1 without increasing λV 1 . Hence player 1 will not deviate. Now consider player 2. If he deviates to a lower bid, he reduces Δ 2 without changing his probability of winning the contest when judge H is the decision maker. Note that * 1 e < V 2 . If player 2 deviates to * 1 e , he reduces Δ 2 but increases the probability that judge H will vote for him from 0 to 0.5. His payoff is
Then player 2 will not deviate to
Finally, suppose player 2 deviates to a bid greater than * 1 e , say * 1 e + β , where β > 0. Then he reduces Δ 2 but increases the probability that judge H will vote for him from 0 to 1. The payoff from this deviation is:
Clearly, there exists a small but positive value of β which ensures that e . Therefore, to show that player 2 has no profitable deviation, it suffices to prove that ) (
given the stated conditions in the proposition.
. This is player 2's payoff if he were to get judge H's vote with certainty by only matching player 1's bid, 
Then given (11), ) 0 (
To see that the equilibrium in proposition 1 is the only pure-strategy equilibrium, recall 
Note that  < 1/3.
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Then given the inequality condition in proposition 1 and the fact that the equilibrium is the only pure-strategy equilibrium, we get the following result:
Corollary 1: There is no pure-strategy equilibrium of the nested contest if (i) λ ≥ 1/3, and/or (ii) This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2: Suppose that the nested contest has a pure-strategy equilibrium and aggregate efforts in the all-pay auction are higher than the aggregate efforts in the Tullock contest. Then aggregate efforts in the pure-strategy equilibrium of the nested contest --a convex combination of the all-pay auction and the Tullock contest --may not lie between aggregate efforts in the allpay auction and aggregate efforts in the Tullock contest.
17
As an example, suppose that V 1 = 10, V 2 = 4.15, and λ = 0.01. 
Mixed-strategy equilibria
Lemma 1: If V 1 = V 2 = V > 0, then there exists a non-degenerate symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the nested contest for all ) 1 , 0 (   . It has no atoms at points of discontinuity.
Proof:
The proof comes from noting that when V 1 = V 2 = V, this discontinuous game has no pure-strategy equilibrium (i.e., corollary 1 above) and satisfies Theorem 6 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) .
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To apply Theorem 6 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) , a player must choose his action (bid) from a non-empty and compact set. In the nested contest, this set is [0, V]. The game must also satisfy the following conditions: first, the sum of the payoffs must be upper semi-continuous. Since Π 1 + Π 2 = V − e 1 − e 2 is continuous, it follows that the sum of the payoffs is upper semi-continuous. Second, Π j must be bounded, j = 1, 2. This holds since
Third, the discontinuity set must be defined such that player j's payoff is discontinuous only if j's strategy is related to player k's strategy by some function, ) ( f jk  , such that e k = f jk (e j ), j ≠ k, j = 1,2, k = 1,2. Since the players' payoffs are only discontinuous at symmetric bids, it follows that the identity function satisfies the desired requirement. Finally, the game must satisfy a property called property (α). To see that this property is satisfied, consider an arbitrary point of discontinuity, e 1 = e 2 = ê ≥ 0. Proof: Theorem 5 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) guarantees the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium. The proof that this theorem is applicable is the same as the proof of lemma 1 except that V is replaced by V j and the players' payoff functions must be weakly lower semi-continuous at points of discontinuity, j = 1, 2. That is, the strict inequality in (*) is replaced with a weak inequality. (2010) requires that at a point of discontinuity, a bidder's success probability must jump to 1. However, at a symmetric positive bid, the CSF in this paper is such that an increase in a player's bid leads to a jump in his success probability from 0.5 to 0.5(1 + λ) < 1 given that λ (0,1). Nevertheless, the CSF in this paper satisfies the spirit of the DS property in Alcade and Dahm (2010) because it pays for a player to increase his bid slightly at points of discontinuity. This is the crucial requirement of the DS property that is relevant for the proof of Lemma 2.3 in Alcade and Dahm (2010) . Part (b) of the DS property in Alcade and Dahm (2010) is required to ensure that property (α) in Theorem 6 of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) is satisfied. 21 Property (α) is a stronger version of the requirement of weakly lower semi-continuity. It is property (α) which ensures that the players' equilibrium symmetric mixed strategies have no atoms at points of discontinuity.
participates. The equilibrium expected payoffs and expected bids are
E(e 1 ) = V 2 /2, and E(e 2 ) = (V 2 ) 2 /2V 1 .
Proof: Note that if the equilibrium in proposition 3 exists, then it must be a non-degenerate mixed-strategy equilibrium because the equilibrium in proposition 1 is the only pure-strategy equilibrium and it has a different set of equilibrium payoffs from the payoffs in proposition 3.
The claims about the equilibrium expected payoffs and bids can be shown by applying First, it is obvious that the nested contest success function satisfies the anonymity property because a contestant's success probability is independent of his identity; it only depends on the vector of bids.
The elasticity condition has two parts: E1 and E2. Let {x, G}N + . Define η j (e j ,e k ) as the elasticity of a contestant's success probability with respect to his effort, j = 1, 2; k = 1, 2. Given the anonymity condition, there is no loss of generality in dropping subscripts. Condition E1 in Alcalde and Dahm (2010) is satisfied if 22 See note 20 of this paper.
for all x } x ,...,
, and x satisfies x ≤ GV 1 < x + 1.
Based on the results in Alcade and Dahm (2010), we know that the Tullock contest success function and the all-pay auction (APA) success function each satisfies (13). Therefore, we can write:
Then multiplying the first inequality in (14) by (1 − λ), the second inequality by λ, and adding
Then the inequality in (15) implies that the nested contest success function satisfies condition E1
in Alcade and Dahm (2010) . Finally, we have to show that when λ ≥ 0.25, the nested CSF satisfies condition E2.
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The nested CSF satisfies condition E2 in Alcade and Dahm (2010) if
23 According to Alcade and Dahm (2010, p. 4) , to ensure that a contest has an all-pay auction equilibrium, condition E2 in their paper "... specifies a minimum win probability that outbidding the opponent by the minimum amount must yield, implying that the CSF must be sufficiently discriminating in favor of the higher bidder. This specifies a lower bound on how much the extreme case of the APA (all-pay auction), in which the higher bidder definitely wins the contest, can be relaxed." parenthesis mine.
The inequality in (16) holds for x = 0. For x ≥ 1, it can be rewritten as λ ≥ 0.5/(x + 1).
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The denominator of the expression on the right hand side is strictly decreasing in x and so it is maximized at x = 1 where it attains the value of 0.25. Hence the nested CSF satisfies condition E2 if λ ≥ 0.25. This completes the proof that when λ ≥ 0.25, the nested contest has an all-pay auction equilibrium.
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Regarding the other claims in proposition 3, we apply Lemma B.2 in Alcade and Dahm (2010) . This lemma says that when a symmetric two-player contest has a symmetric equilibrium (possibly in mixed strategies) and there is complete rent dissipation in this equilibrium, then the asymmetric version of the contest (i.e., players with non-identical valuations) has an equilibrium which is the same as the equilibrium of the symmetric contest except that the player with the smaller valuation abstains from the contest with a positive probability. Accordingly, I investigate the symmetric version of this contest in appendices A and B and demonstrate the other claims in proposition 3. QED Propositions 1 and 3 imply the following corollary:
, then there exist two payoff-non-equivalent equilibria in the nested contest: a pure-strategy non-all-pay auction equilibrium as in proposition 1 and a mixed-strategy all-pay auction equilibrium as in proposition 3. (2010) is defined as an equilibrium with the same expected equilibrium payoffs and total efforts (but not necessarily the same distribution functions) as the standard all-pay auction in Baye et. al (1996) and Hillman and Riley (1989) . Theorem 3.2 in Alcalde and Dahm (2010) states sufficient conditions that a CSF must satisfy in order to guarantee the existence of an all-pay auction equilibrium.
The equilibria in corollary 2 cannot be ranked using the Pareto criterion. Obviously, player 2 is better off in the equilibrium in proposition 1 since 
where the dependence of 
Towards a contradiction, suppose that when corollary 2 holds, player 1 is not worse off in the equilibrium in proposition 1 relative to the equilibrium in proposition 3. Then the expression in (18) (18) is non-negative, the inequality in (19) does not hold. This contradicts the claim that corollary 2 holds and player 1 is not worse off in the equilibrium in proposition 1 relative to the equilibrium in proposition 3. Accordingly, if corollary 2 holds, then player 1 must be worse off in the equilibrium in proposition 1.
Discussion
Corollary 2 is interesting. To appreciate this point, Baye et. al (1996) showed that in an all-pay auction with three or more players, there could be multiple equilibria. However, these equilibria are all payoff-equivalent. Alcalde and Dahm (2010) also find a similar result for imperfectly discriminating contests. In a Tullock contest with three or more players, Ewerhart (2012) shows that there are multiple non-payoff equivalent equilibria if the returns parameter of the Tullock CSF is sufficiently high.
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Corollary 2 is interesting because it shows that with only two players, there are multiple non-payoff equivalent equilibria in the nested contest. Also, it is interesting that one equilibrium does not Pareto dominate the other because player 1 prefers one equilibrium while player 2 prefers the other equilibrium.
If proposition 1 holds, then the nested contest gives smaller individual and aggregate efforts than a standard Tullock contest. Hence if the goal is to reduce aggregate effort (i.e., wasteful rent-seeking efforts), then this contest is better than a Tullock contest. Intuitively, the pure-strategy equilibrium in proposition exists if a sufficiently high weight is put on the Tullock component of the nested contest. Since 0 / * 1
, it follows that in the equilibrium in proposition 1, the stronger player is better off when a bigger weight is put on the all-pay auction component of the contest while the weaker player is worse off.
Proposition 2 is particularly striking because it shows that a contest which is a convex combination of the all-pay auction and the Tullock contest could yield an aggregate effort which is not a convex combination of the aggregate efforts in the Tullock contest and all-pay auction.
Thus the nested contest could have different properties from its underlying contests. In fact, when proposition 2 holds, then aggregate effort in the nested contest is smaller than aggregate effort in the Tullock contest and it is also smaller than aggregate effort in the all-pay auction. If the goal is to reduce aggregate effort (i.e., wasteful rent-seeking efforts), then this contest may be better than both the Tullock contest and the all-pay auction.
The intuition for proposition 2 requires an understanding of the intuition for the equilibrium in proposition 1. First, a pure-strategy equilibrium exists if the weight on the all-pay auction is sufficiently small. Then the asymmetry in valuations induces a competition for only the Tullock-contest part of the rent because by maximizing his payoff based on only the Tullock part, the strong contestant exerts a higher effort which is enough to guarantee the all-pay auction part of the rent. Since the all-pay auction part of the rent is sufficiently small, it does not pay for the weak contestant to outbid the strong contestant in order to get the all-pay auction part especially when the asymmetry in valuations is sufficiently high. So he also maximizes his payoff based on the Tullock part of the rent. And since their valuations in the Tullock part is smaller than their valuation if the game was only a Tullock contest and also given that their valuations is reduced by the same proportion (i.e., from V j to (1 − λ)V j ), it follows that each player's effort is smaller.
28 28 The equal proportional reduction in their valuations is crucial because reductions in their valuations that are not proportionally the same could lead to a rise in aggregate efforts (see Epstein and Nitzan, 2006b ).
Unlike the two-player all-pay auction, proposition 3 implies that neither player randomizes uniformly over a given support in a mixed-strategy equilibrium. Finally, because the auction success function is an explicit component of the nested CSF in (3), we can say more about the properties of the distribution function (in a mixed-strategy equilibrium) than is possible in Alcade and Dahm (2010) and Baye et al. (1994) .
Conclusion
The Tullock contest and all-pay auction have been examined separately in the literature on contests. This paper has taken the first step of examining a contest which is a nested version of these two popular contests. Some properties of the equilibria of this nested contest differ from all-pay auction and Tullock contests. In addition to Alcade and Dahm (2010) , this approach may be an alternative way of studying departures from the all-pay auction. For example, one could use this approach to study the robustness of the "exclusion principle" in Baye et al. (1993) . It remains to describe the properties of an equilibrium to the nested contest when )
. By lemma 2, we know that an equilibrium exists and given part (ii) of proposition 1, it will be a non-degenerate mixed strategy because   ˆ. I conjecture that it will be a non-all-pay auction equilibrium. Experimental studies of this nested contest will also be interesting. All these extensions are left for future investigations.
Appendix A
Following up on lemma 1, we can establish a bit more about the nature of the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of this contest. Accordingly, I undertake this investigation.
Let G(e j ) be the common cumulative distribution function (cdf) with support ] v , v [ by player j in a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, j = 1, 2. Since there is no pure-strategy equilibrium in the symmetric case, it follows that a mixed-strategy equilibrium will necessarily be non-degenerate. Therefore,
Then suppressing v , v , and V in the expression for Ω j , we may write player j's payoff as:
Since in a non-degenerate mixed-strategy equilibrium, no player puts a probability mass equal to 1 on a bid of zero, 29 it follows that v e j  ≥ V gives ) e ( j j  < 0, j = 1,2. Then given that a player can guarantee himself a minimum payoff of zero, it follows that v < V. Similarly,
is unique, j = 1, 2.
I shall now prove some lemmas by drawing on arguments that are similar to those in Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye et al. (1996) but differ from them in some respects because the nested contest has a Tullock component. In what follows, I note that in a symmetric equilibrium, ẽ ẽ j  , j = 1, 2.
Lemma 3: Neither player will be bid a positive bid with positive probability; equilibrium strategies (above zero) are continuous mixed strategies.
Proof: To see this, suppose (without loss of generality) that player 1 bids e 1 = 1 ê > 0 with positive probability. Then the probability that player 2 wins rises discontinuously as function of his bid at e 2 = 1 ê . Hence there exists ε > 0 such that player 2 will bid on the interval [ 1 ê -ε, 1 ê ]
with zero probability.
30
But then player 1 is better off bidding 1 ê -ε instead of 1 ê since his probability of winning is the same. This contradicts the hypothesis that bidding e 1 = 1 ê > 0 with positive probability is an equilibrium strategy. QED 29 We shall show that there is no atom on zero. 30 This is also true in the case of non-identical players. To elaborate, note that for e 1 > 0, e 2 /(e 1 + e 2 ) is strictly increasing in e 2 . Suppose (without loss of generality) that player 1 bids e 1 = 1 ê > 0 with probability δ > 0. Let without reducing λG(e j )V, j = 1, 2. Now suppose instead that ẽ v  . Then bidding ẽ (a higher bid) dominates bidding v because player j increases Ω j (e j ) without reducing λG(e j )V, j = 1, 2.
QED.
Lemma 5: In a symmetric equilibrium, no player puts an atom on v .
Proof:
In a symmetric equilibrium, the lower bound of the support of each player's mixed strategy is v . Suppose that ẽ v  > 0. Then lemma 3 implies that there cannot be an atom at v .
Suppose instead that ẽ v  = 0. Towards a contradiction, suppose that player 1 puts an atom on v = 0 in a symmetric equilibrium. Then there exists some ε > 0 such that player 2 is better off bidding v + ε > 0 than bidding v since his success probability increases discontinuously. Alternatively, since a bid of zero is a point of discontinuity, Theorem 6 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) implies that there is no atom at zero. QED.
Lemma 6: The equilibrium distribution, G(e), is (i) differentiable on
, and (iii) strictly convex on a subset of its support.
Proof:
For parts (i) and (ii), see appendix B. Consider part (iii). Towards a contradiction, suppose that ) e ( G j is concave on its entire support, j = 1, 2. Then we cannot construct a nondegenerate mixed-strategy equilibrium because, given that Ω(e j ) is a strictly concave function,
, will also be strictly concave in e j and so a unique e j maximizes each player's payoff given the strategy of the other player, j = 1, 2. Thus a necessary condition for constructing a non-degenerate mixed-strategy equilibrium is that G(e j ) is strictly convex on, at least, a subset of its support. QED.
In a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium,
. Lemmas 3 and 5 imply that the players randomize their bids
Expanding (A.4) and simplifying gives .5) 32 Recall that the present game satisfies Theorem 6 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) . This theorem does not rule out the existence of asymmetric equilibria in symmetric discontinuous games. However, by appealing to this theorem, we know that a symmetric mixed-strategy exists in this game, as stated in lemma 1. Therefore, given that our focus is on symmetric equilibria of the game, it is correct to claim that the players' mixed strategy must have the same support in equilibrium.
The left hand side of (A.5) is positive since 0 < λ < 1. Therefore, the right hand side must also be positive. This gives
. Otherwise, the optimized value of Ω(e) will be negative. Therefore,
Given (A.4), we require that in a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium,
. Expanding and simplifying gives
Given lemma 4, we rewrite equation
As in Alcade and Dahm (2010) and Baye et al. (1994) , an explicit solution for the distribution function, G(e), given that the strategy space is continuous, is either impossible or very difficult.
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In the present game, the desired cumulative distribution function implicitly satisfies equations (A.6) and A.7). Its existence is guaranteed by Theorem 6 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) . 34 Like Alcalde and Dahm (2010) and Baye et al. (1994) , I am unable to prove that it is unique. . QED. 36 If ∂Ω/∂e 1 = 0 at the optimum, this point is obvious. If ∂Ω/∂e 1 < 0 at the optimum, then strict concavity of Ω(e 1 ) and e 1 ≥ 0 rules out ∂Ω/∂e 1 = 0 at any other point.
